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CHAPTER I
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In this report ADL assesses the business and public policy issues that
will be important for NASA to consider in the design of a program for stimu-
lating uses and interesting potential users of the Space Transportation Sys-
tem in the U.S. private sector and in foreign countries, in preparation for
operations of the STS in the early 1980s. We also characterize other salient
factors that will need to be given special consideration in developing uses
of STS in the international field.
A key finding of the study, which involved personal or mail contact
with 45 leading U.S. organizations--primarily multinational manufacturing
companies active in advanced technology fields--is that there is both a
knowledge gap about precisely what STS can contribute to the profitable
functioning of such enterprises in the 1980s and 1990s and a communications
gap in making available such knowledge as exists. A key conclusion is that
these gaps can probably be closed by well-thought-out, well-organized and
energetic research and market development efforts and that closing them is
crucial to securing widespread utilization of the STS by the private sector.
The study suggests that R&D uses of the STS, of a fairly basic kind,
will probably have the greatest attraction for the U.S. private sector in
the early 1980s but that the scale of such uses, in the light of the scale
of the whole private sector industrial R&D budget at that time, may be some-
what less than presently-projected STS capacity committed to such uses.
Transition to a condition of an excess of demand over capacity, by later
in the 1980s, is seen as a possibility, however, considering potential
uses of the STS for processing, sensing, telecommunications and navigation,
and energy-production support. All of these estimates are presented with
substantial qualifications since they can be verified, if at all, only by
much more extended research on a number of fronts.
Realistic appreciation of the potential of the STS for achieving pri-
vate sector objectives is also severely constrained at this time by the
absence of a well-developed, explicit set of terms and conditions on which
STS services will become available. To overcome this barrier the report
T-1 Arthur I) Ijttle Inc.
recommends development of an STS "Tariff Model" which will deal initially
with at least the following subjects of crucial interest to prospective
users:
* the expected organizational structure of the entity that will form
the interface with the user community;
• the procedure for mission planning;
* the procedure for making and accepting offers to contract for ser-
vices and resolution of competing demands;
* price formulas;
* explicit provisions that will govern the disposition of patentable
inventions and utilized or generated knowhow;
• statements of basic policy in at least the following areas: safety
requirements, environmental protection requirements, discrimination
(or non-discrimination) among different classes of potential users,
separation among military and non-military missions/payloads, utili-
zation of telecommunications, required availability or dissemination
of data acquired by on-board sensors, the extent to which the competi-
tive status of private sector users will be considered, and the ex-
tent to which other Federal government policies affecting data gen-
erated on-board will be applied.
The report endorses the concept of the development of a "middleman or-
ganization" distinct from NASA itself to carry out the market development
and, later, the marketing function: Ultimately, it is suggested, such an
organization should become completely independent of NASA, generating its
revenues from fees paid by users of STS and, in turn, purchasing facilities
and services from NASA. The report spells out the evolutionary steps in
the development of such an organization as follows:
* Contracting out, by NASA, of further market research, institutional
development, and market development--to organizations similar to
those employed in Phase I.
* Contracting out, by NASA, of responsibilities for actual sales of
service to users--employing the concept of an exclusive agency,
relying on one (possibly several) market development and marketing
organizations. It is implied that, at this stage, the market will
not be strong enough for the agent to operate without NASA financing.
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* Creation, almost certainly by legislation, of an independent, regu-
lated monopoly to market the commercial services of the STS, stand-
ing on its own financial feet, purchasing services from NASA.
It is not yet possible to estimate the time required for the complete
evolution--it could be as long as 20 years and as short as 5. Much depends
on findings in further market research, on the level of support for market
development, and on demonstrated capabilities of STS to meet real commercial
needs.
With respect to the foreign market a principal finding of the study--
at this stage constrained from field research in foreign countries--is that
an international marketing program will need to distinguish among the dis-
tinctive interests and capabilities, with respect to STS, of the highly-
industrialized, service-oriented economies (the U.S., Western Europe, Japan
and the Soviet Union), the rapidly industrializing and/or petroleum-based
economies (e.g. Brazil, Iran, Saudi Arabia), and the agriculturally-based
developing economies. The study also notes that a distinguishing charac-
teristic of all foreign markets for STS will be the need for special efforts
to develop and extend an atmosphere of trust and confidence in NASA on the
part of foreign users, to resolve a large number of complex legal issues,
and to establish a specialized management structure for the international
market development effort.
The Phase II program recommended for dealing with the areas included
in the ADL effort would involve the following elements:
* Further identification and analysis of the interests of foreign
users, necessarily involving field interviews abroad;
* A careful study of the terms and conditions on which STS services
will become available and their embodiment in an evolving STS Tariff
Model;
* Detailed development of the structure and program of a new, inde-
pendent marketing entity which would ultimately make STS services,
supplied by NASA, available to the user community, including careful
consideration of the transitional stages through which such a de-
velopment must move, over a 5 to 20 year period;
* Continuing elaboration of presently fragmentary knowledge about both
uses and users in the private sector, drawing on other studies and
contractors as appropriate.
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CHAPTER II
INTRODUCTION
The Space Transportation System (STS) is now being developed for op-
erational use in the 1980s and beyond. It is designed to provide economi-
cal transportation to and from earth orbit and to allow more efficient
space exploration and utilization for man's benefit. The major elements
of this system can be reused after operations in earth orbit and will
eventually replace many of the non-recoverable launch vehicles now used
for placing payloads in space.
The key elements of the STS are the Space Shuttle Orbiter and its
solid rocket booster motors being developed with industrial support by the
U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the Spacelab
manned laboratory being developed by NASA and the European Space Agency
(ESA), and an Interim Upper Stage (IUS) for the Orbiter under development
by the U.S. Department of Defense. A more advanced upper stage, the
Space Tug,is also being developed by NASA to offer expanded capabilities
and uses for the Space Transportation System after 1984. The Tug will
provide greater system flexibility for operations in geosynchronous orbits,
for orbital path changes and deep space operations with emphasis on space
rendezvous and docking capability.
The complete system is designed not only to place a variety of pay-
loads into various earth orbits and into trajectories throughout the solar
system, but also to make possible the retrieval, refurbishment, repair and
even refiring of spacecraft, thus reducing operational expenses signifi-
cantly. It will provide a "shirtsleeve" working environment so that crew
and passengers can spend up to one month in earth orbit, performing the
role of a manned space station and allowing a variety of experimental and
operational activities to be carried out under unique space conditions of
close to zero gravity, zero vibration, zero contamination and absolute
vacuum. The operational characteristics of STS launchings and reentries
will be-sufficiently less rigorous than those of present satellites as to
permit orbital travel by a wide range of scientists, engineers, and others
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not physically qualified as astronauts, thus expanding the range of skills
available for space missions ,
NASA is committed to making the STS available to non-NASA organizations
on a cost-reimbursable basis. This includes other U.S. governmental agen-
cies, U.S. private commercial enterprises and educational institutions as
well as foreign governments and foreign private sector users.
Stimulating cost-reimbursable use of STS outside NASA and military
programs presents some.new problems, analogous to those which face any or-
ganization seeking to market an advanced new technological capability to
potential users not well-acquainted with its characteristics and with little
idea of how it might advance their own objectives. Accordingly, NASA has
commissioned a series of limited, first phase studies of elements of those
problems with the expectation that a second phase of such a study program
--based on insights gained in the first--will follow.
The ADL effort reported in this document is one of four such studies
being carried out more or less simultaneously by different contractors with
a common theme but different emphases. The common theme is an effort to
describe methodologies appropriate for NASA to use in identifying new uses
and users of the. STS in what will eventually be a marketing program. The
different emphases are on potential uses and users in
* the Federal and state governments (other than the military services)2
* the private industrial and commercial sectors of the U.S. industrial
3
economy ;
* the educational community in the United States ;
* the international community, together with consideration of issues
of business/public policy significant to private sector users both
in the U.S. and abroad5
See Appendix B for a more extended description of the STS.
2 The emphasis in the study carried out by Stanford Research Institute at
Huntsville, Alabama, in the six-month period ending June 20, 1974.
The emphasis in the study carried out by Battelle Columbus Laboratories
in the six-month period ending June 30, 1974.
The emphasis in the study being carried out by the University of Alabama
at Huntsville for completion by September 1, 1974.
The emphases in the ADL study.
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All of the studies .have been deliberately constrained by low budgets
($37,500, except for the University of Alabama which was funded at $25,000)
and short time schedules; they are considered by both the contractors and
NASA as exploratory only.
Several other recent studies of aspects of the utilization of STS are
relevant to NASA's marketing problem and strategy. ,These include a series
of studies by the General Electric Company of "Beneficial Uses of Space"
(BUS) and a series by Aerospace Corporation of "Business Risks and the
Value of Operations in Space" (BRAVO). These, along with other selected
published materials we have found useful as background in preparing this
report, are cited in Appendix D.
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CHAPTER III
OBJECTIVE, SCOPE AND RESEARCH APPROACH OF THIS STUDY
The initially-stated objectives of the ADL effort were to:
* Develop market-research and market development methodologies
for stimulating STS uses by U.S. commercial and foreign users,
and
* Define a Phase II program for in-depth market research, in-
cluding the identification of public policy issues requiring
early attention.
The following six tasks were envisioned:
* Review and expand data on prospective uses and users,
* Define conditions critical to commercial and industrial users,
* Differentiate the importance of such conditions as between
domestic and foreign users,
* Evaluate and rank the conditions most likely to affect the
marketability of the STS in the U.S. and abroad,
* Explore options for public policy, administrative practices,
organizational forms, and operational arrangements for market-
ing the STS, and
* Define a Phase II program for in-depth market research; and
identify public policy issues requiring early action.
After the commencement of the contract NASA requested that this initial
phase of the work program be modified to the extent of not making direct
contact with potential foreign user groups. Our evaluation of foreign user
interests and requirements therefore is of necessity based on existing in-
house ADL information and experience as well as information obtained from
various "surrogates", such as executives of U.S. multinational corporations.
A further modification of the initially-stated objectives developed
in the course of the work primarily as a consequence of the relative time-
phasing of the Battelle and ADL studies. The Battelle study was contracted
about three months in advance of the ADL study and completed two months
earlier. The concentration of Battelle on developing a statement of de-
tailed marketing methodology appropriate for a program aimed at stimulat-
ing private sector uses, especially in the U.S.A., and our broad concurrence
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with Battelle on the utility and comprehensiveness of that methodology as
reported in Battelle's mid-term briefing, suggested to us and the NASA COR
that we should emphasize elements of the problem not present in the Battelle
analysis--or in Battelle's terms of reference--especially the business and
public policy issues which, it appears to us, may well be determinative to
the success of an STS marketing program. Along with the effort to differ-
entiate between the interests and responses characteristic of foreign as
opposed to domestic users, this emphasis on business and public policy
issues has come to dominate the ADL study--which accordingly gives rela-
tively reduced attention to detailed marketing methodology per se.
Our approach, after literature search and analysis, centered on an
interview program in the U.S. private sector among large, technologically-
oriented manufacturing companies. To compensate for our inability to in-
terview foreign companies directly, we biased our sample of U.S. companies
by singling out those with substantial overseas operating experience and,
within those companies, further seeking to talk with top-level executives
whose personal experience encompassed overseas operations.
As a basis for such interviews we prepared the guidelines presented
in Appendix A, backed up by a technical brief specially prepared for this
purpose (Appendix B).
Because of limitations on an extensive interview program imposed by
budget and time constraints, we arranged to sample a wider range of re-
spondents through the cooperation of the Industrial Research Institute,
Inc., the leading professional organization of Directors of Industrial Re-
search. IRI kindly agreed to set up a special task force on the STS and,
with our assistance, carried out a mail inquiry about knowledge and inter-
est in STS capabilities among its key members.
Results of the interview program and the IRI inquiry are discussed in
Chapters V and VI. Names of organizations with whom contact was made appear
in Appendix C.
We also carried out a number of interviews, involving discussions of
policies and policy issues likely to be significant to STS marketing, with
knowledgeable senior staff at NASA Headquarters. On matters involving
patents and inventions we acknowledge with thanks the cooperation of NASA
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legal counsel with whom we discussed our views and who informally reviewed
our conclusions.
Interviews and literature references were further supplemented by dis-
cussions with and commentary from a wide range of ADL professional staff,
many of whom have substantial experience in international marketing, par-
ticularly of advanced technologies, and, in addition, a wide range of ex-
posures to business and public policy issues of the kinds considered else-
where in this report.
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CHAPTER IV
STS CAPABILITIES AVAILABLE TO THE U.S.
PRIVATE SECTOR AND FOREIGN USERS
A number of preliminary studies have already been undertaken to
identify the nature of the opportunities which the characteristics of
the STS system will afford to various user groups, including the U.S.
Department of Defense and other government agencies, the U.S. private
sector and potential foreign government and private sector users.
This section of the report provides a summary of the STS services
which the existing state of knowledge and experience indicates will be
available to the U.S. private sector and foreign users during the 1980-
1991 period. A definition of such services and applications, as well
as the existing set of terms and conditions on which access will be made
available, is critical information for any consideration of such questions
as:
* who the probable users will be;
* how much use will they make of it;
* when will they use it;
* under what conditions will they seek access to it; and
* how might the STS program best be marketed to those
potential user groups.
For the most part, the service to be marketed is access to the space
environment through the unique capabilities of this new form of transpor-
tation. The basic services of the STS will be:
* Use of the Spacelab during 7-30 day sorties to
conduct experiments, process products, and carry
out a number of related activities under conditions
of close to zero gravity, zero vibration, zero contami-,
nation and within an absolute vacuum,
* Use of the shuttle to deliver a payload, or a payload
with an upper stage, into orbit,
• Use of the shuttle to service (repair, refurbish or re-
plenish) automated satellites already in space, and
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" Use of the shuttle to retrieve spacecraft from
orbit
In addition, access to the information collected in space by the
various user groups will be of considerable value to a wide range of
users in the United States and abroad who will have little or no under-
standing of the STS program per se. Thus, the STS marketing program
must also consider how best to market such information to such potential
users.
The uses which the unique characteristics of the STS appear to
offer have been presented in some detail in a number of other reports.
For the most part they fall into five general, but not mutually ex-
clusive, categories:
R & D
* Sensing
* Communications/Navigation
* Energy
* Space Processing
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
The STS opens up vast opportunities for research and development
concerning.the properties of earth substances in space, as well as the
properties and utilization of space itself. Many of the results of this
work will undoubtedly lead to specific applications for space processing,
sensing, communications/navigation, and energy generation.
R&D activities which will be conducted as part of the STS program
include attempts to extend applicable ground-based technology into the
space environment where specific investigations require access to the
unique characteristics of the space environment to supplement or
verify ground-based data. Typically, these investigations are necessary
steps in the development of new materials, new systems, and new concepts.
The STS will open up new opportunities for fundamental physics and
chemistry research that cannot be done on the ground.
In much the same way that emphasis has been given to R&D activities
during many of the space efforts to date, such as during the Skylab
program, so it can be anticipated that the early STS payloads will be
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heavily oriented to R&D activities.
SENSING
Space shuttle sorties present many opportunities related to the
observation of earth phenomena. This includes not only the observations
which men will be able to make from space during sorties, but the
ability to deliver and retrieve, repair and refurbish automated earth
observation satellites from space.
Sensing applications fall into four broad categories:
* earth resources
* environmental quality
* weather and climate
* earth and ocean physics
Potential applications related to the earth's'resources include
studying the earth's mineral, forestry, agricultural and marine resources.
International organizations, such as the FAO, governments and resource
oriented firms will undoubtedly find this application of considerable
interest.
The potential benefits to be derived from the application of space
technology to pollution monitoring are generally well recognized. This
includes air, water, and land pollution. The principal "users" of
course would not be commercial enterprises but rather government organ-
izations at the national, state and local level, foreign as well as
domestic. NASA activities in these areas are advanced. Studies of
weather and climate as well as earth and ocean physics are also likely
to be undertaken primarily by government organizations for the ultimate
benefit of a wide variety of user groups.
COMMUNICATIONS AND NAVIGATION
NASA's communications and navigation space program has to date relied
on expendable launch vehicles to carry satellites into space. This method
of transportation has required that satellite size and weight be compat-
ible with the capabilities of launch vehicles. In some cases the vehicle
could not support the desired spacecraft mission. Therefore, because a
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large cost increment would have been necessary in order to use the next
larger launch vehicle, occasional compromises in spacecraft capability
that limited the payload to more moderate mission goals were at times
necessary.
The availability of the STS will overcome these delivery problems and
will enable automated communications and navigational satellites to be re-
trieved, repaired and refurbished. Such services will be of benefit to
commercial users in the United States and abroad, as well as government
users, especially in that design engineering reliability standards can be
substantially relaxed as it becomes possible to repair such satellites in
orbit. Major cost savings are foreseen.
ENERGY
The STS will enable man to explore new methods of overcoming the world's
energy problems. It will make available a unique transport capability for
the large payloads required if novel concepts for power generation methods
located in space are to become a reality. Such methods could include solar
energy conversion and nuclear fission and fusion in space.
SPACE PROCESSING
The characteristics of space which will be made accessible through the
STS will enable some high technology products to be produced that could not
be produced on earth or could not be produced as well on earth.
The range of processing applications theoretically possible in the
space environment is suggested by the following twelve ideas generated by
a recent GE study undertaken for NASA. It is likely, however, that a great
deal of research must be undertaken in the years ahead to determine what
space processing applications will prove to be financially as well as tech-
nically feasible.
Potential Application Basic Reasoning
* Imprinting circuitry on Elimination of vibration from
crystal wafers for surface imprinting system
acoustic wave electronics
" Particle manipulation by Elimination of gravity masking
small forces effect
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Potential Application Basic Reasoning
* Vibration testing of small Improvement of present 4CPS
motors limit, isolation from sonic
and magnetic fields
* Single crystal and eutectic Certain superalloys not amenable
high temperature turbine to casting; present crystals small
buckets and contain dislocations; eutec-
tics contain dislocation, etc.
* High purity tungsten x-ray Contamination of melt by
targets crucible
* Precise separation of radio- High specificity separation
isotopes techniques
* Silicon crystal growth Convection during crystal growth
* Epitaxial growth of magnetic Convection, loss of supersatura-
bubble memory crystals tion
* Amorphous glasses and Crystallization due to inclu-
refractories sions, convection
* Basic heat transfer data Convection during measurements
* Separation of isoenzymes Denaturation of Isoenzymes
by separation under G loading
* Utilization of biorhythms Terrestrial influences
THE STATE OF KNOWLEDGE ABOUT APPLICATIONS, GENERALLY
Despite the indications of utility reviewed above, our overall im-
pression of the state of knowledge about precisely what uses of STS will
prove to be most attractive, particularly from the point of view of the
private sector, is that too little is yet known to validate any firm con-
clusions about the potential commercial significance of such uses. Clos-
ing this knowledge gap through extensive research and experimentation is
unquestionably one of NASA's primary tasks, if the STS is to be perceived
by the private sector as significant to its own interests. Against this
background of a knowledge gap we discuss prospects for private sector
utilization in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER V
PROSPECTS FOR PRIVATE SECTOR UTILIZATION
In this chapter we summarize our views as to the scope (and uncer-
tainties) of the private sector market for STS services in the 1980s to
the extent that such views can be derived from the limited samplings of
the market that we have thus far been able to make. Unfortunately, the
dominant conclusion to be drawn from our interviews of senior executives
of U.S. corporations is that private U.S. industry is not yet prepared to
comment with any specificity on its probable utilization of STS services.
This conclusion is verified by the nature of the response to the mail in-
quiry along the same lines made for us by the Industrial Research Institute
whose member companies do the bulk of the industrially-supported R&D in
the United States.
As noted in Chapter III, IRI's Shuttle Survey Task Force submitted a
version of our interview guidelines (see Appendix A) to 41 of its member
companies, inviting written comments and/or indication of willingness to
meet with ADL for a day's discussion on the issues under review. Only 13
replied and of these only three indicated real interest in pursuing the
subject. This response (7% interest) is significant because it is unusual
for IRI members to be unresponsive on matters of concern to them, as we
found when we collaborated with IRI a year ago on a study of "Barriers to
Innovation in Industry: Opportunities for Public Policy Changes", under-
taken for the National Science Foundation.
We are persuaded, as noted, to conclude that U.S. companies find it
difficult to take an interest in a venture they consider so remote from
their needs and so far in advance of them. Individual responses emphasize
this point:
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* "Frankly, the urgency of this puzzles me a bit."
0 "Please keep us informed as plans develop...in case the STS
program does fit with our future plans."
0 "Priorities on the available time of our corporate development
and technical staff preclude our working on the opportunities
represented by the commercial utilization of the space shuttle
at this time."
* "We find it hard to think so far in the future when we have
so many concerns over the next few years."
Statements such as these indicate that there is need for a strong and
well-directed promotional effort on behalf of STS if industry is to be
stimulated into taking early enough interest to utilize the lead time be-
tween now and the early 1980s to prepare for commercial utilization.
However, despite limited present understanding and interest exhibited
by the private sector, there are a number of areas in which it is possible
to characterize the extent to which this potential user group is likely to
seek access to the various services to be offered by the STS. Our conclu-
sions in more detail, and the reasoning which leads us to them, follow.
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
Interaction with industry in the interview program substantiates the
view that the R&D support capability of STS will be the aspect of greatest
interest to industry, at least during the initial years. It also suggests,
however, that R&D users of the STS in the 1980s will be operating in a
buyers' market.
To provide some gauge of what this market may be we present, in Table
V-1, an estimate of R&D expenditures during 1975 in the five industrial
sectors most likely to find STS relevant to their needs. It is within an
overall budget such as this that STS R&D (mostly basic for a while) is
likely to have to find its place.
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TABLE V-I
ESTIMATED R&D EXPENDITURES BY SELECTED
U.S. INDUSTRIES, 1975
Industry Estimated Company-Funded R&D, 1975
Total R&D Basic Research
(millions of dollars)
Drugs and Medicine 750 140
Electronics 2,500 80
Fabricated Metals 200 20
Industrial Chemicals 1,025 125
Non-Ferrous Metals 233 40
4,708 405
Sources: Report on "Materials and Man's Needs", National Academy of Sci-
ences, 1974; Arthur D. Little estimates.
Assuming a continuation of 1972-1975 trends in growth of R&D expendi-
tures (about 5% per annum), the total R&D expenditures of the five "most-
likely-to-be-interested" industry sectors listed in Table V-I will approxi-
mate $6,000 million in 1980, of which some $500 million might be devoted
to basic research.
Though none of our industry respondents would venture even a guess as
to what percentage of annual total R&D or basic research expenditures his
firm might devote to STS uses in the early 1980s, most speculated that it
would be no more than one percent, and that the objective would more likely
be basic research than applied research or development. Even among the
largest companies, we encountered such remarks as "Oh, I might be willing
to authorize $250,000 if my top physicist was burning with desire to under-
take some speculative R&D project in a space lab," or "We would have little
interest in any tests or experiments in which the cost is measured in a
couple of million dollars for rather limited results."
These very rough estimates suggest that all the most likely U.S.
private sector R&D users, taken together, may not spend more than $5
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million per year on STS related activities in the early 1980s. Consider-
ing that, as a rule of thumb, those most interested or knowledgeable esti-
mated that the "rental costs" of access to the space lab itself would be
only a quarter of their total cost of performing STS-based basic research,
the annual revenue of STS "rental of space" from U.S. private sector R&D
users may possibly not even exceed $1-2 million per year in the early
1980s, i.e., one-tenth to one-fifth of prospective charges for a single
Spacelab sortie.
We were not able to make any such "guesstimates" for potential foreign
commercial users, lacking data that can only be developed through first-
hand investigation abroad. However, we tend to believe that all demand
from such foreign users combined would not exceed the total U.S. patronage
of STS for commercially-oriented basic research.
In short, we believe that in the early 1980s the one-per-year commer-
cially-dedicated Space Shuttle sortie may well be underutilized if reliance
is placed on R&D alone. We therefore reemphasize the need to begin serious
investigation and promotion of potential R&D utilization of STS by industry
at the earliest possible time in order to help create a market.
PROCESSING
Not only do leading R&D directors of major corporations find it diffi-
cult to project whether, where, what for, or how much they might use the
STS for basic research purposes, but they, their engineering colleagues
and company executives, seem to find it premature to speculate about pro-
cessing in STS facilities. Most seem to think that this won't become
practical until the late 1980s, and only after extensive proof-of-principle
efforts undertaken on the ground and in pilot STS operations.
All are agreed on the obvious, i.e., that any material or product
processed in space would have to have an inherent value of thousands of
dollars per pound. Primary metals producers, being in the dollar-per-
pound business, simply cannot visualize how space processing can benefit
their business. They grant that some exotic alloy, manufacturable only
under space conditions, might command a thousand-dollar-per-pound price,
but since this is not their primary business, they currently seem to pay
little attention to such possibilities.
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Even on the assumption that again, say, one percent of total R&D (in-
cluding applied research and engineering development) might be applied to
establishing proof-of-principle or prototype processing facilities aboard
the space shuttle, the annual expenditure of all most likely industries
combined would probably not exceed $60 million, even by the late 1980s.
Again, assuming that only about one-quarter of this amount would go towards
"rental" of Spacelab facilities, the revenue from STS facilities for pro-
cessing would probably not exceed $15 million per year from U.S. users.
Assuming, once again, a similar amount from potential foreign commercial
users, one might predict $30 million per year in the late 1980s, or the
equivalent of charges for three space-shuttle sorties per year. This would
represent a substantial augmentation of.demand over that visualized above
for fairly basic R&D alone.
In summary, with only one commercially-dedicated space shuttle per
year--as now planned--during the 1980s, there could be a transition to a
seller's market in the late 1980s, when processing uses, including applied
research and engineering, might create an excess of demand over available
capacity. This does not take into account space available for commercial
users on other shuttle sorties primarily dedicated to NASA or other agency
(DOD-excepted) uses. If such extra "piggy-back" capacity were to be avail-
able throughout the 1980s the seller's market might not develop as early.
as we have just suggested.
SENSING
Commercial users concerned with earth resources, e.g., mining and
mineral companies, agriculture and timber producers, have a potential in-
terest in data obtainable through sensing from close-in, earth-orbiting
sensors. They have already been getting valuable data from ERTS One and
Two and from Skylab. They expect the development of improved sensing tech-
nology by the time the space shuttle is operative, e.g., by making poss-
ible the use of photography rather than indirect sensing.
However, the data derived from satellite sensing is considered not so
unique and definitive as to warrant concerns by any one corporation about
exclusivity of ownership. Putting it differently, particularly as far as
mineral exploration is concerned, the data based on surface observations
gives only indirect clues as to minerals at appreciable depths. There
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remains, therefore, substantial uncertainty and a great deal depends on
the judgments and supporting on-the-ground data that has to be provided by
each individual company. Thus, the sensing data available to everyone
still lends itself to a considerable range of interpretations.
Consequently, industry's need in this area of potential STS utilization
is not for exclusivity or proprietary information. Fortunately, this is in
line with political judgment, embodied in the Administration's explicit
practice of sharing ERTS-type information with all users. It may therefore
be advantageous to consider whether a private or public sector service
organization should be created which would operate the most advanced equip-
ment aboard the space shuttle and on the ground, and sell the data output
to all comers. A principal requirement of such a service organization would
be accurate and rapid processing and distribution of data, some of it sea-
sonal (e.g., in relation to agriculture). Careful scheduling of data re-
quirements and space shuttle sortie flights would be imperative.
Tn any event it does seem likely that demands for sensed data, in-
volving the presence of a manned or man-monitored sensor, might provide
some share of a market for STS use fairly early in the 1980s.
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
INTELSAT/COMSAT operations now provide satellite communication ser-
vices. Additional private and national systems are under consideration.
In light of the extensive and complex experience of COMSAT gained,in creat-
ing an international consortium, we would expect the STS telecommunication
uses to provide additional technical capabilities (such as in situ repair
of even geosynchronous satellites, or additional free-flying, near-earth
orbit satellites for special communication purposes). Depending on cost
factors not yet elaborated, we can visualize some of the major computer-
business data-oriented, multinational firms, based here or abroad, to be
interested in considering the creation of their own satellite network in
order to have the complete in-house systems capability of delivering point-
to-point business-communications performance on a global scale.
Both sensing and telecommunications are so intimately bound up with
issues of international politics and related U.S. positions that any quan-
titative estimate of potential commercial uses of STS in these two cate-
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gories--both as to volume and timing--depends primarily on Administration
policy rather than on commercial market demand or opportunities. We there-
fore have not attempted such estimates under the scope of this assignment.
Nonetheless we believe they are worthy of careful investigation and will
probably provide some share of commercial demand for STS capabilities in
the 1980s. We have noted above the possible indirect interest in STS which
telecommunications companies are likely to have as a result of its promise
as a contributor to relaxed standards of equipment reliability in communi-
cations and navigation satellites.
ENERGY
The space shuttle is an essential component of a space transportation
system if satellite power-producing plants are ever to come into being. An
example of such satellite power plants is the Solar Satellite Power Station
1
concept . Use of the shuttle for such a venture will depend, in large mea-
sure, on priorities for federal funding of R&D and other incentives to
press ahead with that concept--or with alternative energy-from-space con-
cepts, such as placing nuclear fission (breeder) plants in earth orbit.
In another context, the possibility of producing thin-wafer solar
cells on a space-platform production line has been suggested, because of
unique advantages of weightlessness and control of purity. Such an activity
would enhance the potential of terrestrial generation of electric power from
solar energy. Proof-of-principle and cost analyses are still lacking to
make this candidate for energy-related space-processing more than a gleam
in the eye.
1 See Feasibility Study of a Satellite Solar Power Station, NASA CR-2357,
Arthur D. Little, Inc., February 1974, NTIS, Springfield, Va. 22151.
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CHAPTER VI
TERMS AND CONDITIONS LIKELY TO BE OF IMPORTANCE TO
POTENTIAL U.S. PRIVATE SECTOR USERS
ADL interviews with senior executives of major U.S. corporations, as
well as the assistance provided by the Industrial Research Institute and
their corporate members, also explored the terms and conditions under which
the U.S. private sector might be interested in taking advantage of STS
services. As already suggested in Chapter V, it became clear that most
senior U.S. corporate officials have great difficulty in assessing their
interest in utilization of the STS during the 1980-1991 period, because
they:
* are traditionally absorbed with short-term concerns,
* don't perceive, or have a difficult time grasping, the relevance
of the services which the STS may provide during the 1980-1991
period to their corporate interests, and
• have more questions than answers about the terms and conditions
under which they might find access to STS services advantageous.
This is not surprising. What it emphasizes, however, is that STS ca-
pabilities will only be effectively marketed to the private sector if the
STS is perceived by senior executives to offer services likely to enhance
corporate profitability. To do so the service must:
* be recognized as important to the furtherance of corporate objectives;
* be competitively priced in relationship to alternative uses of
capital;
* fall within the realm of acceptable risk.
In spite of these difficulties ADL's interaction to date with the
U.S. private sector did elicit a number of tentative comments suggestive
of the major issues of concern to U.S. industry in the years ahead as they
evaluate their interest in the STS services. These major issues include:
* assurance of access to STS services
* the pricing of STS services
* the allocation of risks
o the confidentiality of information
* patent, knowhow and anti-trust policies
* who will sell STS services
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ASSURANCE OF ACCESS TO STS SERVICES
The STS will make available to the private sector access to a range of
services, the terms and conditions of each varying in accordance with the
interests of the selling entity and the needs of each class of user. For
any corporation interested in STS services, however, it is clear that a
considerable lead time and substantial expenditures will be required during
which the corporation must have a high degree of assurance that the STS
will in fact be made available to him, for the uses he needs and within a
price range which can be calculated in advance. The long-term commitment
which the U.S. Government in general and NASA in particular appears to have
made in support of the STS program during the 1980-1981 period, as well as
NASA's expressed intent to provide the private sector with access to STS
services, are thus of.great importance and should go far to providing the
kind of assurance needed. Whether, in addition, some explicit long-range
contractual assurance of availability will be required remains an open
question.
In addition, the potential private sector users will need clarification
and assurance as to exactly what services will be made available. For
example, in addition to carrying payloads, will the private sector have,
as one respondent queried, "access to the dedicated payload computer, data
acquisition systems, data links--additional fuel cells, power converters
and thermal radiators"? Will their flight personnel have access to NASA
training facilities?
Potential users will also want to know how, in spite of Presidential
statements that access will be available on a "non-discriminatory" basis,
by whom, and in accordance with what criteria, will disputes concerning
access be adjudicated.
THE PRICING OF STS SERVICES
A principal constraint on access will certainly be the estimated price
of $10 million per flight, coupled with the substantial sums which a pri-
vate sector user will have to spend before and after each flight. As noted
in Chapter V the "rental costs" of access to the space lab itself may be
only a quarter of a user's total costs associated with the effort. Thus,
the costs associated with STS use are likely to impose a serious constraint
on the extent to which individual U.S. corporations are likely to seek
access to the STS, at least during its early years of availability. As a
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result, it may prove advantageous for groups of companies to work together
to share the costs and risks as well as the benefits of STS utilization.
Such a trend would necessitate a careful evaluation of U.S. antitrust law
and of what changes in the law will be required if private sector joint
ventures are to take advantage of the STS.
Although we have assumed for analytical purposes that the cost per
flight would approximate $10 million and that access would be on a "non-
discriminatory" basis, this would not necessarily foreclose the possibil-
ity of STS services being priced differently for different classes of users
as a means of stimulating one use over another. Such a policy would of
course affect the marketability of the STS to the various classes of poten-
tial users. Alternative ways of stimulating one form of use over another
without developing complex pricing formulas would be through the provision
of special tax advantages or government subsidies to various classes of
users.
STS marketability to the private sector might also be enhanced if
users were permitted to pay a lower initial fee for the service but obli-
gated to pay NASA a royalty as a percentage of the sales of all products
developed as a result of the STS services performed.
Presidential statements, as well as the NASA-ESA agreement, clearly
state that ESA members at least will have access to STS services on the
same basis as potential U.S. users. Although we do not perceive this policy
as a marketing constraint, it should at least be noted that some interview-
ees within the U.S. private sector feel strongly that U.S. industry should
be in a favored position relative to their, competitors abroad with regard
to access and price, since it will have been their tax dollars that made
most of the STS possible.
INSURANCE AGAINST RISKS INVOLVED IN USING THE STS
Although NASA has had considerable experience in dealing with the
unique risks associated with space flights, the existence of such substan-
tial and often incalculable risks could pose a major constraint on the in-
terest of private sector users. The potential private sector user will not
take advantage of the STS unless it can calculate, and at reasonable cost
insure, its payload and personnel as well as its total investment in the
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business from loss caused by NASA, by other users or by unforeseen occur-
rences. For example, were an unexpected contingency to abort a flight,
would NASA guarantee to refly the payload at no additional cost to the
user? What liabilities to injured third parties will a user be exposed to?
The experience of COMSAT as well as of those involved in nuclear power
plant development may suggest how these potential constraints to the market-
ability of STS services can best be overcome to a degree acceptable to po-
tential private sector users.
CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION
The extent to which confidentiality will be important to commercial
sector clients as a precondition to use appears to vary substantially. For
example, mineral resource sensing from space, according to industry offi-
cials, provides only general clues of enormous uncertainty as to the min-
erals below the earth's surface. Since the same sensing data will be valu-
able only if it is interpreted correctly by specialists on earth, reluctance
to give knowledge to competitors that a company is seeking such information
is not likely to create a major constraint on the marketability of this STS
service. On the other hand, knowledge that a competitor plans to undertake
a major new manufacturing process in space could be extremely valuable in-
formation. A potential STS user for the latter purpose could consider
assurances of privacy of great importance.
PATENT, KNOWHOW AND ANTITRUST POLICIES
To the extent that a corporation invests its own money it usually wants
exclusive use of any data or products that result, except possibly for
rights which NASA might want for governmental purposes. This was the fairly
consistent view of those potential private sector users contacted during
the course of this initial investigation. Anything less than this is likely
to impose a constraint on the marketability of STS services to a number of
potential private sector users.
As has already been mentioned, the high cost associated with use of
the STS is likely to stimulate interest in joint corporate endeavors in
space which may present antitrust problems and act as a marketing constraint.
At least in the area of sensing, one approach which might avoid these anti-
trust problems would be the creation of independent service corporations
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which would utilize the STS and sell the information to all interested
parties. Policies and procedures could undoubtedly be devised to stimulate
the creation of such new service organizations.
THE SELLER OF STS SERVICES
Experience, as well as recent interviews, suggest that U.S. corpora-
tions would rather deal with a private or semi-private seller of STS ser-
vices than with a government entity. This is due to the belief that govern-
ment entities are more bureaucratic, don't really understand the needs of
business, are susceptible to political pressures, and are often primarily
concerned with "feathering their own nests".
Although NASA will undoubtedly be responsible for carrying out each
STS sortie, and could develop marketing capabilities, we believe that STS
services could more effectively be marketed to the private sector by a more
independent business-oriented entity. An independent COMSAT-type of struc-
ture, which was financially self-supporting through user's fees, was sug-
gested by some respondents as a prototype organizational arrangement to be
considered.
CONCLUSIONS
U.S. corporations which theoretically might benefit from the unique
services which will be offered by the STS will treat the STS in the same
manner as any other business opportunity, the critical issue being whether
the investment in such services is likely to increase profitability more
than alternative utilizations of corporate resources. The terms and con-
ditions upon which STS services will be offered to corporations will, of
course, be of critical importance in determining the marketability of the
STS to this class of potential user.
The interviews conducted with various U.S. corporate officials clearly
showed that they had a very difficult time formulating views on the terms
and conditions under which they might seek to buy STS services because of
a lack of understanding of how such services really relate to their own
corporate interests.
The foregoing should not at all suggest that the private sector cannot
in the immediate future help in the NASA process of developing a realistic
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package of opportunities, terms and conditions, but rather that a continu-
ing interaction process must take place between NASA and this potential
user group before such a package can be forthcoming.
It is clear, however, as a result of this initial study, that the in-
teraction process should focus on questions relating to access to and
pricing of STS services, insurance against risks, questions of confiden-
tiality, patent protection and antitrust, and issues relating to who the
seller of STS services to this class of user should be.
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CHAPTER VII
THE FOREIGN MARKET FOR THE STS
During the 1980s it is likely that the world will be made up of the
following three major groups of economies, distinguished by the amount of
capital and technological capabilities available to each to pay for and
take advantage of the STS.
* Highly industrialized, service-oriented economies
The United States, Western Europe, Japan and the Soviet Union
will fall into this category. Without question the private and
public sectors of these economies will constitute the major targets
for STS services. In terms of demand characteristics, these econ-
omies will be quite similar to the United States. The question pre-
sented to NASA therefore in its consideration of how best to market
STS services to potential users in these countries will not be so
much what STS services are relevant to these economies as how such
services should be marketed within them. The marketing of such ser-
vices to the Soviet Union will, of course, pose unique issues.
* Rapidly industrializing and petroleum-based economies
Brazil is the best example of an economy which, in the 1980s,
will have developed such a substantial industrial base and level of
technological sophistication that it will be able to pay for and
benefit from many of the results of the STS program, but to a more
limited degree than will be the case of the more highly industrial-
ized economies. It is unlikely that such countries will be prepared
to utilize the STS for R&D purposes. They are likely to be particu-
larly interested in STS sensing and communications capabilities.
Petroleum-based economies, such as Saudi Arabia and Iran, will
undoubtedly utilize their extraordinary foreign exchange earnings
over .the next decade to develop their industrial capabilities. Al-
though they certainly will have accumulated sufficient capital to
pay for STS services they are unlikely to have developed the techno-
logical capabilities to enable them to participate directly in the
STS program or benefit from many of the results. Again, STS sensing
and communications activities are most likely to be of greatest
relevance to this group of countries.
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* Agriculturally-based developing economies
The vast majority of the world's economies will not during the
1980s be in a position to pay for STS space, nor will they have de-
veloped the technological skills to enable them to take advantage
of many of the benefits derived from the STS program. At the same
time, these economies would certainly benefit from some of the in-
formation and technology developed during the course of the program.
These nations, which already represent more than two-thirds of the
world's population, have increasingly come to feel that the United
States, and the other industrially advanced nations, have not been
prepared to share their money or technological advances with them.
Economic, humanitarian and political factors warrant those respon-
sible for the marketing of the STS to give consideration to how this
group of nations might interface with the STS program.
A foreign marketing program for STS must begin by clearly distinguish-
ing among these three major economic groups and developing approaches appro-
priate and specialized for each. It will of course be true that many of
the considerations which will affect the marketing of STS services in the
United States will be important in foreign marketing as well. There are,
however, other, complicating factors arising from nationalistic attitudes
as well as differing legal and political systems of potential foreign users.
These factors, like the basic economic differences earlier referred to,
must also be analyzed with care if the STS is to be marketed effectively
abroad with a minimum of political problems and a maximization of benefits.
Initially at least, potential foreign user governments and enterprises
will test the U.S. Government's good will and intentions as well as seek
clarification on a number of issues. For example:
* Will the U.S. be truly non-discriminatory vis-a-vis foreign cor-
porate and governmental users with regard to access to the STS,
the pricing.of STS services, and the sharing of information de-
veloped by the STS?
* How much will foreign users have to reveal to American authorities
to justify STS utilization?
* How will the confidentiality of proprietary data provided and de-
veloped be maintained?
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* How will differences in patent and licensing laws be reconciled?
* Will foreign corporations be permitted to undertake joint STS ac-
tivities legal in their country but illegal in the U.S.? Will
joint U.S.-foreign corporate efforts, legal abroad but illegal in
the U.S., be permitted?
• Under what conditions will foreigners have access to NASA and U.S.
corporate technology and knowhow?
* Under what conditions will the U.S. Government permit itself to be
sued? In which jurisdiction? What will the process entail? What
will be the ultimate tribunal?
These questions fall into three broad areas of concern which must be
taken into account in the formulation of an STS marketing strategy to po-
tential foreign user groups:
* The development of trust between NASA and potential foreign users
* The resolution of international legal questions
* The structuring of STS international marketing mechanisms
THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRUST BETWEEN NASA AND POTENTIAL FOREIGN USERS
Foreign corporations are, in general, not used to dealing with U.S.
Government agencies such as NASA. This inexperience, coupled with funda-
mental nationalistic feelings, is likely at times to cause foreign execu-
tives to view U.S. intentions with some mistrust. Some will assume that,
regardless of official declarations of non-discrimination among users, U.S.
officials will be under pressure from American corporations, Congress, and
possibly the military services to favor American users because American
companies and the military do not support the subsidized export of aero-
space and other industrial knowhow paid for by U.S. tax dollars.
The existence of this sentiment may cause foreign companies stalled
in negotiations with NASA to accuse NASA of deliberately favoring American
competitors. They will find support for their mistrust in the attitude of
many American executives who oppose what the executives see as a "giveaway
program". Such sentiments were expressed a number of times during the
course of recent ADL interviews. For example:
"I am strongly of the opinion that the U.S. should not give away, on
equal monetary terms, space to foreign companies for experiments or
manufacturing activities in the STS program. They should pay more."
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"It seems pretty clear that there will be many conflicts of interest
between U.S. and ESRO based industrial firms as well as between ESRO
and NASA. Early recognition of these conflicts of interest should be
given by NASA and a policy of avoiding giveaways will be necessary to
secure continued political and budgetary support for the space shuttle
program. Of course, there are international cooperation advantages
at least in the political sphere. But we must be quite sensitive to
the conflict between these and the commercial interests of U.S. indus-
try and the nation as a whole."
Department of Justice antitrust lawyers may, in the eyes of foreign-
ers, be under similar corporate or Congressional pressure to discriminate
against foreign users. Many European executives already feel that American
antitrust laws are administered prejudicially against them when they try to
acquire American companies. Thus they may believe that European joint
ventures for space R&D which are legal in Europe may be blocked by the
Justice Department, especially since American companies would argue that
otherwise they would be at a disadvantage.
Maintenance of the confidentiality of foreign proprietary data may be
questioned since NASA will be seen to have close ties to U.S. industry par-
ticularly in view of the transfer of personnel back and forth between NASA
and the private sector. While NASA has an excellent record with regard to
the proper handling of proprietary information, the large and diverse com-
mercial efforts likely to arise from the availability of the STS, against
a background of U.S.-European rivalry, may make the maintenance of confi-
dentiality an area of increasing European concern.
Many Europeans feel that Americans are arrogant about space and ad-
vanced technology generally. It has been said that Americans are involved
in a "patron rather than partner" syndrome. Under such circumstances,
even well-intended American advice may be a source of friction and conflict.
Although the views expressed above have focused primarily on European
attitudes and U.S.-European rivalries, they are undoubtedly representative
of the problems which NASA will face with regard to the Japanese, the
Soviets and other potential foreign government and private sector users.
For example, many U.S. executives feel strongly that Japanese industry has
benefited to an inordinate extent from U.S. research and development efforts,
which have been sold to the Japanese for a fraction of their value. They
note the Japanese Government's close working relationships with and exten-
sive support for Japanese industry, as well as Japan's more relaxed anti-
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trust laws, and conclude that U.S. industry is at a considerable competitive
disadvantage. They would anticipate that a Japanese Government organization,
such as MITI, will actively participate in the STS program and then provide
the resulting information and knowhow to all interested Japanese industries
and institutions. STS policies which would appear to perpetuate this situa-
tion would continue to grate on many U.S. executives and create questions
on the part of potential Japanese STS users. Although these problems are
not new to NASA, the STS marketing program, both organizationally and sub-
stantively, must be able to deal effectively with them.
THE RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL QUESTIONS
Many patent, licensing, antitrust, jurisdictional, and other interna-
tional legal issues will have to be resolved during the course of STS de-
velopment and operation. As an indication of the extraordinary complexity
of these issues, some of the key questions which will have to be resolved
in the patent field are:
* If NASA adopts uniform patent provisions for domestic and foreign
users, any of them might ipso facto be discriminatory to foreign
users because of variations between various national patent laws--
e.g., U.S. patent law has no mandatory licensing provision for
failure to use, while most foreign patent laws do.
* Whose patent laws will apply to inventions made in space or reduced
to practice in space? This is a particularly troublesome legal
question. The shuttle service is U.S. owned, the space laboratories
being built by ESA may be U.S. owned or owned by various foreign
governments or corporations (to whom ESA may sell them), the invent-
or may not be from the same country which owns the particular lab
in which the invention occurs, and the invention itself might be
made over Rhodesia or over Japan.
* Are there special problems in relation to the U.S. reserving a
license for government use (leaving the user entitled to commercial
use) in those countries where the government engages in commercial
activities or is the commercial entrepreneur, e.g., the U.S.S.R.?
* What enforcement procedures are needed to deal with infringements
if a patent has been granted for an invention which is only useful
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in space (thus not covered by any national government's patent)?
For example, if a German company makes a perfect crystal in space
and has the process patented in Germany, and a U.S. company infringes
on the patent in a subsequent spacecraft, a question is raised as to
the territorial limits of the restraint on the infringement and whose
business it is to enforce whatever rights may be involved. Where an
invention is patented in ten countries the problems are compounded.
Serious consideration should be given in Phase II to dealing in at
least a preliminary way with these legal complexities and potential problems.
THE STRUCTURING OF STS INTERNATIONAL MARKETING MECHANISMS
The structure for marketing STS services to potential foreign users
must be integrated into the total STS organization plan and coordinated
with the marketing of STS services to domestic government and private
sector users.
There are at least four possible basic structures conceivable for in-
ternational STS marketing:
* A unitary structure--one international unit for the total effort
* A multilateral structure--separate units for each of the major
market areas (e.g. NASA, ESA, etc.)
SA multinational structure--one national unit for each country
* A United States structure--one U.S. unit handling the worldwide
effort.
There are difficulties inherent in a marketing program run by many
semi-autonomous bodies. Just as differences over system interface prob-
lems have had to be resolved (e.g., over Spacelab/Orbiter weight goals),
conflicting, interests will have to be dealt with during the development,
production, and marketing phases of the STS.
From a theoretical point of view, a true unitary structure with multi-
national jurisdiction, direction, financing, and staffing up and down the
line might seem best because it would minimize parochial interests. How-
ever, creating a truly international working team, as opposed to a facade,
may be extremely difficult. National governments may tend to assert their
own.interests in the joint decision-making process. Intense national com-
petition for top posts may be divisive. The current bilateral NASA-ESA
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relationship itself could be an obstacle to the creation of a unitary effort.
Some analysts say that "Europeans can't agree on anything except to keep
Americans out". Thus ESA and European governments may oppose direct links
between Americans and European users without some European public control
and participation in the relationships. European companies may wish to
draw on their governments or ESA for support.
A multilateral U.S.-European structure might appeal to Europeans who
wish to maintain autonomy from the U.S. They may hope that a European-wide
organization-could obtain better access, financial, patent, antitrust, and
other terms than a merely national organization could. However, ESA or
other European-wide organizations are often under pressure from European
national interests. Sometimes European-wide institutions are paralyzed
and give way to direct government-to-government behind-the-scenes negotia-
tions. Factors other than sound business principles may thus influence
some aspects of the STS marketing and utilization program. One U.S. Gov-
ernment official experienced in joint U.S.-European efforts has stated:
"...The joint decision-making process is diluted by shared authority
and shared responsibility at all levels. I consider this aspect to
/ be a key problem confronting all types of multinational programs and
it is almost impossible to solve. In short, between partners there
can be no boss. There can only be negotiated decision. Thus, future
managers need to recognize that international consortia, when joint
decision-making is the objective, necessitate 'compromise'. Comprom-
ise leaves the door ajar to all sorts of national external pressures
and prejudices..."
A structure with one unit for each country, on the other hand, risks
severe fragmentation and parochialism. Each nation has its own tradition
of business-government relations which might become institutionalized with
each government formally and continually representing the interests of its
nationals in conflicts with NASA. A U.S. marketing entity might thus be
severely restricted in activities seeking direct access to foreign customers.
To exclude the U.S. from foreign marketing would tend to force compli-
cated multilayered interactions, limiting direct marketer-user contact and
thereby tending to restrict utilization. A United States structure, with
one U.S. unit handling all marketing worldwide, would offer the benefit of
maximizing direct contact and interaction between the U.S. marketer and
potential foreign users. Although they may not be experienced in dealing
with U.S. government agencies, potential foreign corporate users are likely
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to be large multinational firms with experience in worldwide business re-
lations. Except to bring in European governments or ESA on an ad hoc basis
when conflict with U.S. interests arises, European corporations may prefer
direct links to the U.S. marketing organization in the hope of facilitating
the planning and reducing the cost of utilization. It is even possible
that the participation of a European government may be perceived as unde-
sirable by European companies which wish to maintain the confidentiality
of proprietary information even with respect to their own governments.
Since the economic interests and prestige of ESA members are deeply
involved in the Spacelab development effort, the governments are likely to
want to maintain the involvement of European public institutions in the
marketing and utilization of STS services. One way of minimizing complexi-
ties under these circumstances would be careful design of the formal mecha-
nisms for adjusting differences that may arise between the U.S. marketing
entity and potential European users, especially in those matters in which
European public institutions might wish to intervene. For example, resort
to an international arbitration authority perceived as truly impartial
could reduce the likelihood of direct governmental intervention.
Political problems may also arise with other countries. Communist
bloc nations may wish to participate. Some Third World countries may also
wish to send technicians into space to satisfy demands of national prestige
even though the effort could not be justified on economic grounds.
Developing countries may also feel that the benefits of STS utiliza-
tion should be shared worldwide. Some mechanism for disseminating non-
proprietary information, a form of technology transfer, may be justified on
political as well as economic and humanitarian grounds. Possibilities to
be considered would include resort to the participation of existing inter-
national organizations in the STS program, the strengthening of NASA's own
international programs, the participation of Third World countries as a
group, or the establishment of an organization, which might be tied to the
National Academy of Engineering, which would be responsible for interfacing
with the STS program and channeling such non-proprietary results through
the U.S. Aid Program or through the United Nations.
Not every barrier to a truly international unitary effort arises from
high-level competition for control and jurisdiction. More commonplace
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operating problems such as staffing can also contribute difficulty. Staff-
ing can be a problem for several reasons:
* Incentives may be insufficient for governments and corporations to
assign outstanding personnel to an international STS marketing effort.
Unlike work in the engineering, production, and scientific activities
of STS, participation in STS "support organizations" such as market-
ing, may not be considered a step forward along a career path.
* Getting talented individuals to live abroad may be difficult and
expensive.
* Many individuals will remain loyal to their own nation's interests,
government policies, or company desires.
* Development of an open, regular personal relationship between Ameri-
can and foreign staff members will be handicapped, as in other multi-
national organizations by nationalism, transoceanic distances, lan-
guage and culture problems and the relatively high costs entailed
in any international activity.
In any event, the precise structure of the STS marketing activity,
whether it takes unitary form, or one of the suggested alternates, will
have substantial effects on the success of the marketing effort. Attention
to questions of structure thus becomes a requisite of a Phase II marketing
program.
CONCLUSIONS
It will require detailed market research, including in-depth inter-
views, to go much further than the impressionistic conclusions recorded
above toward assessing foreign markets for STS and dealing with their unique.
problems. Broadly speaking, foreign markets will have most of the charac-
teristics and difficulties for stimulating interest that are present in
the U.S. market, with an overlay of the additional complexities reviewed
in this chapter. Nonetheless, as European participation in the Spacelab
program attests, at least the industrialized country governments are inter-
ested in the STS and it seems highly predictable that the private sectors
of these countries will, in due course, also become involved. The interests
of the Soviet Bloc countries and the Third World are less easy to foresee,
but a marketing effort for STS will nevertheless need to take their potential
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into account. For the reasons given above, development of trust, develop-
ment of solutions for international legal problems whose solutions may re-
quire long lead times, and attention to issues of internal structure of
the marketing mechanism will have special significance for the foreign
marketing effort.
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CHAPTER VIII
THE NEED FOR AN STS TARIFF MODEL
A fundamental obstacle to the development of a realistic STS market-
ing program to reach potential users has been the absence of an explicit
statement of the principal terms and conditions on which access to the STS
will be made available. It has become possible over the last year or two
to state with growing precision the technical characteristics of the Orbiter,
Spacelab and even the Tug, and to lay out--in a series of progressively
more definite mission and payload "models"--an increasingly clear picture
of what operations will be like in the early 1980s. It is not yet possible,
however, for a potential user, seriously interested in beginning an analy-
sis of the costs and benefits of the STS to his 1980 programs, to get an
equally satisfactory answer to key questions, such as those described in
Chapters VI and VII, about conditions which will surround access.
What is needed soon we choose to call a "Tariff Model"1 , thus relating
it to the Mission and Payload Models already in evolution. While it is
understandable why such an STS Tariff Model is not yet available, its early
construction should be a primary task of the Phase II market development
program.
The availability of an STS Tariff Model, with characteristics indicated
below, will make it possible for market researchers in Phase II to give po-
tential users a much clearer idea of the total package of rights and obli-
gations that will condition access to the capabilities of the STS and, in
turn, to receive a more realistic response about the probability of utili-
zation by prospective users. Discussion of the terms, conditions and under-
lying policies to be embodied in an evolving Tariff Model will also permit
NASA to evaluate more realistically the trade-offs which necessarily must
be made between user interests and NASA/Government interests. Thus, as is
already apparent in the case of the Mission and Payload Models, the Tariff
The term is used here in its generic sense, as in the transportation in-
dustry, to include the entire package of rights and liabilities offered
to the users, going beyond the mere price schedules, as in "tariff...
explanation, information, a list of things, particularly of fees to be
paid, from arafa, to inform" (Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary
of the English Language, Second Edition 1967).
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Model itself will become a tool for policy and institutional development
within NASA, bringing into continually clearer focus the realities of the
future program and the steps to be taken to accomplish it.
Before outlining suggested substantive content for the STS Tariff
Model, it will be useful to indicate what some of its more general charac-
teristics should be:
* It should be comprehensive. An effort should be made to develop as
complete a statement of the conditions likely to be imposed on uti-
lization as is possible in the present state of policy and organiza-
tional development within NASA.
* It necessarily must have a tentative and open-ended quality. What
is envisioned is a series of evolutionary statements, to be revised
at intervals as in the case of the Mission and Payload Models, each
successive instrument incorporating the learning developed since the
last but remaining open for further change as progress and policies
become more clearly defined.
* It should be based on, and related to, existing policy and known ex-
perience, both in the automated satellite programs and in relevant
NASA experience with making government-owned facilities available
to the private sector, as in the wind tunnel case. We believe, how-
ever, on the basis of our preliminary work, that some new issues of
policy will need to be dealt with.
* It should be related to, based on, and specialized for the character-
istics of the several quite different markets in which STS services
will be offered--to other agencies of the U.S. Government, to, foreign
governments, to the private sector at home and abroad, and to the
differing functional components of these markets--R&D, processing,
sensing, telecommunications, energy, education, and possibly others.
* It should be written with simplicity and clarity.
Given the foregoing general characteristics, the STS Tariff Model should
deal initially with at least the following subjects:
* the expected organizational structure of the entity that will form
the interface with the user community;
* the procedure for mission planning;
• the procedure for making and accepting offers to contract for ser-
vices and resolution of competing demands;
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" price formulas;
* explicit provisions that will govern the disposition of patentable
inventions and utilized or generated knowhow;
• statements of basic policy in at least the following areas: safety
requirements, environmental protection requirements, discrimination
(or non-discrimination) among different classes of potential users,
separation among military and non-military missions/payloads, utili-
zation of telecommunications, required availability or dissemination
of data acquired by on-board sensors, the extent to which the competi-
tive status of private sector users will be considered, and the ex-
tent to which other Federal government policies affecting data gen-
erated on-board will be applied.
The construction of even a first draft Tariff Model covering the fore-
going areas would be a task requiring resources well beyond those available
in this Phase I study. However, we comment briefly below on each of these
aspects as some indication of the nature of the present state of policy de-
velopment within NASA with respect to them (as it appears to us on the
basis of necessarily cursory exploration) and to point out some initial
directions for Phase II work in Tariff Model development.
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
It seems likely that, in a year or two, some form of specialized mar-
keting organization for selling STS services will begin emerging within
NASA. Whether the model should be that used in making wind tunnel service
available, or the "middleman" organization envisaged in the recent Battelle
study, or some other more radical concept such as a new Federally-chartered
corporation along COMSAT lines is, of course, not yet clear. The Tariff
Model should at least present a range of organizational possibilities, dis-
cuss their implications for the customer, and go as far toward describing
the functions of the emerging organization as is possible in each success-
ive version of the model.
PROCEDURE FOR MISSION PLANNING
An important part of the STS Tariff Model will be a clear and detailed
explanation of how a prospective user's requirements are to be fitted into
the Mission and Payload Models. Since, at least in the early stages, long
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lead times will be required for both parties to the ultimate transaction,
readiness to commit funds and key personnel in user organizations will be
enhanced substantially by the existence of a spelled-out, step-by-step
procedure leading from the initial, exploratory inquiry to final accept-
ance of an on-board experiment or operation. An early prototype for the
first steps in such a procedure which has come to our attention is the
series of "Announcements of Opportunity" to participate in the definition
of instrumentation for Spacelab missions, currently being issued by the
Office of the NASA Associate Administrator for Space Science. These con-
tain such critical items as a description of the concept of an Instrument
Definition Team, how such a team--drawn from the user community--will be
selected, organized, financed, related to NASA's own technical staff,
scheduled; what proposals to participate should contain, how they will be
evaluated and on what criteria; eligibility of foreign proposers and the
involvement of their governments and/or ESRO/ESA; and how technical data
the offeror does not want disclosed is to be handled. Such matters, and
many more of a similar nature, should be covered in the STS Tariff Model.
PROCEDURES FOR CONTRACTING FOR SERVICE
Similar to the need for a description of procedure for mission plan-
ning is the need in the Tariff Model for a step-by-step description of'the
procedure that will lead from an indication of interest in a contract to
purchase STS service to the fully executed contract itself. NASA's long
experience in the wind tunnel field may have substantial relevance here and
should be carefully investigated during Phase II.
PRICE FORMULAS
As emphasized in Chapter VI, pricing will naturally be a critical part
of the Tariff Model and will have far-reaching effects on both the scale
and timing of customer interest and on NASA's own budget and program. We
understand that first steps toward developing policies on pricing and a
system of cost accounting to permit rational policy-making with respect to
pricing have already been taken. Among policy decisions which will be cri-
tical in the pricing area are those with respect to cost-pricing versus
value-pricing, and the use of pricing to achieve policy objectives other
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than cost recovery itself--such as widespread utilization, differential
pricing among classes of users or classes of uses. The important point,
however, is that early development of such policies and a translation of
these into explicit price schedules will more significantly affect deci-
sions of prospective users than any other aspect of the Tariff Model. NASA
may also have to face the question of whether it can. or will guarantee the
stability of the announced price schedule for some period of time into the
future as an inducement to commitments to long-range planning and expendi-
tures by potential users.
THE DISPOSITION OF PATENTABLE INVENTIONS AND UTILIZED OR GENERATED KNOWHOW
The Tariff Model must also contain a clear statement of applicable
NASA policy affecting patentable inventions and knowhow used in or generated
by STS activity. NASA's extensive policy framework in these areas already
appears to provide ample precedent for STS policy in most respects. The
most likely arrangement with users of the STS would be an analogue to the
policy that NASA applies in current activities where NASA facilities such
as wind tunnels are used by commercial organizations, foreign governments
and academic scientists, reimbursing NASA for cost.
The applicable contract clause provides:
"The experimenter shall disclose to NASA any inventions which he
may conceive or first actually reduce to practice in the use of
NASA facilities, equipment or materials. Rights to those inven-
tions made by the experimenter while performing work for NASA will
be determined by the Administrator under 42 U.S.C. 2456. As to
all other such inventions made by the experimenter, the government
reserves a paid-up license to practice such inventions for govern-
mental purposes unless it is shown to the Administrator's satisfac-
tion that, in view of the circumstances and equities, the govern-
ment is entitled to greater rights or is not justified in acquiring
a license of this scope."
NASA's authority to be as flexible on property rights as this clause
indicates flows from an explicit provision in legislation which sets forth
both the agency's rights to take title to all inventions made in the per-
formance of a contract with NASA and the Administrator's authority to waive
such rights as long as the waiver is subject to a royalty-free license for
government purposes. (Section 305 of the National Aeronautics and Space
Act of 1958).
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Section 305 requires NASA to take title only when the invention is
made under a contract (i.e. where the other party is being paid by NASA);
thus NASA is under no obligation to use the title-taking (or the waiver)
procedure in the case of users of the space shuttle who reimburse NASA for
the cost of the shuttle service. In recent policies applied to launches
for COMSAT and Western Union (Westar), there are policy analogues for space
shuttle users to be able to retain all property rights. In these cases
the companies reimburse NASA for launching costs, but retain all property
rights, including any proprietary data which they might have to provide
NASA for technical launch purposes but which NASA keeps in confidence.
A typology of NASA policy options for reimbursable cost users of STS
is presented in Table VIII-1. An expanded and more definitive statement
will need to be a part of the Tariff Model.
SAFETY REQUIREMENTS
Little controversy should arise over NASA's reserved right to determine
the level of safety to be built into on-board experiments or operations. At
the same time, users will want to have foreknowledge of the safety proced-
ures and standards, as well as policies relative to the allocation of risks.
A safety section will therefore need to be incorporated in the Tariff Model.
As in the case of the invention and knowhow section, this section should
emerge relatively easily from the body of current practice on access to
NASA facilities by the private sector or other government agencies.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION REGULATIONS
This may be a new area for consideration in developing the Tariff Model
although analogues may exist in NASA practice with respect to automated
satellite operations. What is envisaged is a NASA responsibility to ensure
that on-board experiments or operations are carried out in such a way as to
minimize environmental pollution of orbital space. As in the case of safety
it will be important that users be familiarized in advance with the pol-
icies, procedures and standards that will be applied in order that unneces-
sary expenditures of time and funds be avoided by the user.
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TABLE VIII-1
TYPOLOGY OF NASA POLICY OPTIONS FOR REIMBURSABLE COST USERS
Policy Options Implications Rationale
"Hands off" policy No U.S. property rights acquired Users considered paying passengers
and all proprietary data submitted on a transport service.
for launch or safety purposes
protected by NASA.
Data-sharing after reasonable U.S. gets and reports operational U.S. obligated to tell public what
time limit and descriptive data but protects has been accomplished, but need
proprietary data. not disclose proprietary data to
competitors. User gets first crack at
H reporting results (except for earth
HH observation data which must be
available as soon as practicable).
Royalties paid to U.S. on com- Royalties To help NASA recoup original R&D
mercially viable inventions in costs of space shuttle (as opposed
space or on the ground or both to reimbursable costs of shuttle
service).
Royalty-free U.S. license Self-explanatory Users are not paying any of the past
required on patented inventions R&D costs of space shuttle, thus 
U.S.
for use in space only is entitled to license.
Royalty-free U.S. license re- Self-explanatory Users are not paying any of the past
quired on patented inventions R&D costs of space shuttle, thus 
U.S.
for use in space and on the is entitled to license.
ground
E7
TABLE VIII-1 (Continued)
Policy Options Implications Rationale
Compulsory licensing if patent- User would not need to disclose Most foreign patent laws do have
holder doesn't utilize inven- proprietary background data if it such a provision for non-use.
tion after reasonable time provided sufficient operational
period and descriptive data to permit
manufacture
Compulsory licensing with reason- Same as above To compel use.
able royalty for public health
and safety uses
Compulsory licensing with reason- Same.as above. To assure wide usage.
able royalty for all inventions
Compulsory licensing with reason- Self-explanatory Proprietary data might be needed
able royalty for all inventions; in some cases in order to practice
also, proprietary data required the invention.
Foreground and background data NASA publishes data In the case where no invention is
required by NASA made, proprietary data may be need-
ed to make the device.
U.S. takes title with or without Self-explanatory This is an unlikely NASA option--
waiver provision it has almost been ruled out, but
it should be noted that there is a
precedent for it, namely AT&T's
Telstar.
R1
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DISCRIMINATION AMONG CLASSES OF USERS AND USES
Existing policy on access to satellite launching capabilities of NASA,
as between U.S. entities and foreign countries and international organiza-
tions, is one of non-discrimination, as indicated by the President's policy
statement of October 9, 1972. This statement specifically provides that,
"for reimbursable launch services from U.S. launch sites, foreign users
will be charged on the same basis as comparable non-U.S. Government domes-
tic users." Present NASA thinking appears to be that STS services will be
governed by an extension of this principle, although preference, in the
event of scheduling conflicts or payload limitations (but apparently with-
out discrimination in price) is to go to experiments or applications pro-
posed by ESA and foreign governments participating in the Spacelab program.
As noted in Chapter VI, some U.S. prospective users may question the wisdom
of this policy, in the light of the scale of the U.S. investment in R&D and
development of the STS.. Also, as noted later in this Chapter, other public
policies in the U.S., such as those designed to provide preference to small
businesses, may need to be considered as the STS develops.
SEPARATION AMONG MILITARY AND NON-MILITARY MISSIONS/PAYLOADS
It could be of concern to certain classes of prospective users that
their uses would be commingled with military-oriented or classified activi-
ties aboard an STS flight (primarily because of the likely heightened level
of security procedures and rigidities associated with such activities). The
Tariff Model could easily set this issue to rest by providing for what ap-
pears already to be intended--complete separation of military and non-military
payloads and missions.
UTILIZATION OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITIES
The Tariff Model will need to extend to the STS the policies already
worked out for utilization of automated satellites with telecommunications
capabilities, such as conformity with international agreements as to use of
the radio-frequency spectrum, direct broadcast to earth receivers, and the
like. We have not encountered in our preliminary analysis any unique prob-
lems of the STS not also present in the unmanned satellite programs.
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DATA ACQUIRED BY ON-BOARD SENSORS
Policies have already been developed by NASA concerning the required
public dissemination of data acquired by on-board sensors such as those of
ERTS. Such policies, which will presumably be extended to the STS, will
necessarily limit utilization of the STS for acquisition of data for strictly
proprietary use by mining, drilling, or fishing enterprises or for monitor-
ing the movements or locations of a competitor's vehicles or facilities.
These policies will tend tominimize possible political tensions that might
otherwise be generated by the use of STS by, for example, multinational
corporations for proprietary data acquisition. A careful evaluation of
this issue is called for, as is an explicit set of regulations to achieve
desired ends.
POLICY ON COMPETITION
It is conceivable that NASA will be required, by law or executive pol-
icy, to give weight (or price concessions), in making STS services avail-
able in the event of shortfalls in capacity or schedule conflicts, to small
business enterprises, or to discriminate against certain classes of prospec-
tive users, for overriding reasons of policy or to stimulate competition.
This is perhaps unlikely until the STS becomes perceived as a more signifi-
cant factor affecting business competition than it is likely to be for some
years. It is not too early, however, to explore the possible shape of such
policies and to be prepared to reflect them in the Tariff Model if they are
deemed likely to emerge within the next decade.
OTHER FEDERAL GOVERNMENT POLICIES AFFECTING DATA GENERATED ON-BOARD
Analogous to the foregoing policy area is the already-established re-
quirement that users of NASA launch capabilities, even on a reimbursable
basis, must grant a license to the United States Government for governmental
use in all inventions made and knowhow acquired in the field of health and
safety. The probability is high that this requirement will be extended to
the STS. If so, its precise formulation should become a part of the STS
Tariff Model.
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CHAPTER IX
MAJOR ISSUES FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION
In the foregoing chapters we have discussed a range of topics that
bear on
* the long-range objective of NASA in maximizing the use of the STS--
the Space Shuttle, the Spacelab, and the Space Tug, and
* the near-term objective of formulating a plan for pursuing the long-
range objective.
We have borne in mind that the Space Shuttle is basically a transportation
system; that its unique feature is to provide regular access to a new en-
vironment--space; and that NASA's objective in maximizing the use of the
STS is to "sell space", since the STS is the most economical way, presently
foreseen, to work in this environment within the next decade.
The purpose of this chapter is to highlight major issues for further
consideration by NASA as it shapes up Phase II of the Shuttle New User
Analysis Program.
THE NEED FOR A MARKET DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
For many reasons an active market development program is essential to
stimulate utilization of STS, particularly in the early years:
* Even a decade hence many potential users will not be aware of the
potential benefits of STS to them despite widespread publicity.
Companies are swamped with incoming data on new possibilities and
many of these ideas are ignored without serious consideration.
* Corporations which attempt to analyze the potential of STS seriously
may have incomplete data and fail to evaluate opportunities correctly.
* Many executives will have initial difficulty in visualizing specific
commercial applications.
* Potential users may clearly envision the possible benefits of STS,
but may be deterred by the risk of being a pioneer. When executives
are considering substantial investment to prepare for space activity
and millions more for the actual use of STS, who will risk being
first? When risks and costs are perceived as high, the advantage
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of a head start on competitors, possibly of only a few months, may
seem too small. In the face of such possibilities, NASA may wish
to stimulate initial usage in certain activities. Despite a "first
come, first served" non-discriminatory policy, could or should NASA
promise exclusive utilization of STS for a certain activity during
a period of time to companies taking high risks in a pioneering
effort, especially if the effort would require a series of sorties?
* A passive marketing strategy--"let users come to us"--generally
fails when even the most exciting consumer or industrial products
are introduced. Successful corporations have learned the value of
an active marketing program in creating user awareness and accept-
ance. They have abandoned the philosophy typical earlier in this
century that if you invent a better mousetrap, the world will beat
a path to your door. Even more than new mundane products, a revolu-
tionary service such as STS requires an active marketing approach.
Analysis by us in Phase I, and concurrent work by other contributors,
verifies the view that potential users--domestic and foreign, private indus-
try or public sector--are insufficiently informed to give serious attention
early enough to their possible uses of the shuttle. Early enough, that is
to say, to interact productively with NASA or an intermediate organization
so that both the seller of and the customer for STS services can use.the
5 to 6 years lead time remaining to work out technical, organizational,
procedural, legal, fiscal, regulatory, and other operational problems, in
both the private and public sectors at home as well as overseas.
Market development efforts are therefore of high priority now. Since
NASA is not widely known as an organization selling services (though its
windtunnel program and satellite launchings have established successful
precedents), the help of contractors in the marketing effort can be useful.
Involvement of third parties can help overcome the reluctance that some of
the industry has in becoming directly involved with government. Qualified
contractors can also render assistance, through application of market de-
velopment technique and background knowledge of industry sectors most likely
to be interested in STS. NASA does not now appear to have a requisite num-
ber of staff with such experience and would probably find it difficult, ex-
pensive, and time-consuming to find them, although this is not out of the
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question. It may not be prudent to do so, however, in light of the con-
sideration that should be given to establishing a "middleman organization",
one function of which would be to take on the market development task.
Personal direct contact with potential users is an essential element
in the market development effort, together with reaching wider groups through
seminars, professional and management meetings and conventions, and the dis-
tribution and display of appropriate audio-visual material.
In such a market development effort, stress should be placed not only
on conveying the technical opportunities that would benefit potential STS
users, but also the business/public policy considerations that would govern
such uses. Early elaboration of an STS Tariff Model (the general character-
istics of which are outlined in Chapter VIII) would go a long way toward-
answering the questions that we have encountered in our discussions with
potential customers. The lack of answers to such questions at the present
time reinforces industry's hesitance to take a serious interest in planning
its activities to take advantage of the STS program in the 1980s.
In summary, to overcome present barriers to widespread industrial in-
volvement we urge a well-thought-out and intensive effort to convey meaning-
ful technical and tariff information to prospective users, using personal
contacts as much as possible. This will also facilitate evaluation of the
responsiveness of the market and lead to improvements in the approach as
experience is gained.
We assume that the approach to market development will be based on the
well-proven principle that the seller must think in terms of customer needs
and objectives and not primarily of its own.
THE NEED FOR AN STS TARIFF MODEL
We reiterate the importance of developing an STS Tariff Model along
the lines suggested in Chapter VIII. NASA and its contractors should pre-
pare a first draft--taking note of user requirements, and refine it through
iteration as responses from prospective customers are obtained in the con-
current market development effort.
THE NEED FOR A MIDDLEMAN ORGANIZATION
A basic task in succeeding phases of the new user/uses development
(marketing) program in which NASA clearly should engage beginning very soon
IX-3 Arthur D Little, Inc
will be design and development of the organization(s) to carry it out over
the long term. Reasoning presented convincingly in the June 30 report of
Battelle Columbus (cited in Appendix D) points to the desirability of the
development of a "middleman" organization distinct from NASA itself to
carry out the market development and, later, the actual marketing function.
Ultimately such an organization should be completely independent of NASA,
securing its revenues from fees paid by users of STS and, in turn, purchas-
ing facilities and services from NASA.
Such a relationship implies creating, in effect, a monopoly for the
"middleman" organization. A monopoly made possible by public investment
and protected by exclusivity granted by the public power must, in the Ameri-
can system, be a regulated monopoly. The COMSAT model, for exercising the
monopoly of space telecommunications granted by the U.S. Federal Govern-
ment, under regulation established in a very specific statute, comes to
mind. Between the present situation in which NASA must continue for a
while to act as market researcher, market developer, as well as operator
of STS--and the establishment of a COMSAT-like middleman status, lie a
succession of transitional stages. Defining these is properly a function
of a Phase II research program but there appear to be at least the follow-
ing evolutionary steps:
* Contracting out, by NASA, of further market research, institutional
development, and market development--to organizations similar to
those employed in Phase I.
* Contracting out, by NASA, of responsibilities for actual sales of
service to users--employing the concept of an exclusive agency,
relying on one (possibly several) market development and marketing
organizations. It is implied that, at this stage, the market will
not be strong enough for the agent to operate without NASA financing.
' Creation, almost certainly by legislation, of an independent, regu-
lated monopoly to market the commercial services of the STS, stand-
ing on its own financial feet, purchasing services from NASA.
It is not yet possible to estimate the time required for the complete
evolution--it could be as long as 20 years and as short as 5. Much depends
on findings in further market research, on the level of support for market
development, and on demonstrated capabilities of STS to meet real commercial
needs. One thing is certain, it is not too soon to move forward.
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CHAPTER X
A PHASE II STUDY PROGRAM
In this chapter we present the elements which we believe should be
included in a Phase II study program, responsive to
" our findings in the Phase I program reported in the preceding
chapters;
* informal discussions with NASA/MSFC
FURTHER IDENTIFICATION AND ANALYSIS OF FOREIGN USERS
Our work in Phase I put emphasis on considering the interests of po-
tential foreign users and their special requirements as these may affect
NASA policies for stimulating, and providing access for, such users. As
noted previously, we were enjoined, subsequent to starting work, from mak-
ing direct contacts with potential foreign users during this Phase I effort,
and modified our work program accordingly. The contents of Chapter VII of
this report on the foreign market for the STS are, therefore, necessarily
based largely on existing in-house knowledge of public and private sector
objectives, attitudes, business conditions, and technological readiness
in other countries. None of these could be checked or elaborated through
direct research with foreign users, though we gained some useful impres-
sions through "surrogates," such as executives of U.S. multinational cor-
porations.
In light of the above, we believe it essential that continuing work
in Phase II of this program encompass--among other aspects discussed below
--a reasonably comprehensive effort of field research in selected foreign
countries--both in their public and private sectors--in order to assess
firsthand the issues discussed in Chapters VI-IX and to be able to draw
succinct differentiation, if any, between U.S. and foreign users.
We are given to understand by NASA that the European Space Agency
may be ready to have such a U.S.-initiated market research effort begun
in some depth in Phase II of this program (i.e., essentially during 1975),
and that ESA may possibly wish to participate in it with its own resources.
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We would welcome such a collaborative effort in Europe, subject to
NASA concurrence. Similarly, we would welcome collaboration from appro-
priate organizations in Japan, Canada, and Australia, and in the Third
World (though appropriate organizations are less likely to be found there,
except at the national level in a few countries and possibly through multi-
national bodies, such as the OAS, the Andean Pact countries, and multina-
tional Development Banks--IBRD, Inter-American, Asian, African).
If such collaboration were either not forthcoming--or not considered
desirable by NASA--we are, of course, prepared to undertake the work inde-
pendently, provided that no active opposition is encountered in any of the
countries (which is unlikely, though lack of interest may well be a stum-
bling block in the less-developed countries).
In short, we recommend a reasonably comprehensive overseas market-
research effort to clarify the issues raised in this report.
DEVELOPMENT OF AN STS TARIFF MODEL
In Chapter VIII we discuss the need for an STS Tariff Model, and we
recommend that such a tariff model should deal with at least the following
subjects (on each of which we have commented only briefly in Chapter VIII):.
* the expected organizational structure of the entity that will form
the interface with the user community;
* the procedure for mission planning;
* the procedure for making and accepting offers to contract for
services and resolution of competing demands;
* a price schedule;
* explicit provisions that will govern the disposition of patentable
inventions and utilized or generated knowhow;
* statements of basic policy in at least the following areas: safety
requirements, environmental protection requirements, discrimination
(or non-discrimination) among different classes of potential users,
separation among military and non-military missions/payloads, utili-
zation for telecommunications, required availability or dissemina-
tion of data acquired by on-board sensors, the extent to which the
competitive status of private sector users will be considered, and
the extent to which other federal government policies affecting
data generated on-board will be applied.
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These subjects are listed in order of priority as we judge it from
our Phase I work.
DEFINITION OF AN INDEPENDENT MARKETING ENTITY
Serious consideration should be given very soon to the development
of a new entity that will form the interface between NASA and the user com-
munity, the middleman organization described in Chapter IX.
Not only should full consideration be given in Phase II work to the
organizational structure of such an entity, but also to its operational
priorities. High amongst these should be an intensive promotional--educa-
tional in the best sense of the word--effort to alert potential users of
the STS to anticipated opportunities in using the STS that would benefit
them and their customers and communities. The apathy of U.S. industry at
large in this respect--mirrored, we suspect, in some instances at least
abroad--is striking. Considering the long lead times necessary to match
commercial needs for STS services (not yet understood or considered by most
potential users) with the Mission and Payload Models already under active
development by NASA, we believe it essential that industry be brought up
to speed lest it find itself so out-of-step with NASA plans later as to
find those plans disadvantageous to its own interests.
We therefore recommend that the Phase II work lead to a comprehensive
definition of what is required of NASA and/or the suggested interface or-
ganization, particularly with respect to means for developing the market,
that is promoting, STS uses.
In undertaking this work in Phase II, and extending it to the other
items listed in the Tariff Model discussed in Chapter VIII, the contractor
should expect to draw heavily on concurrent work, presumably to be under-
taken by other contractors, that would elaborate in Phase II efforts on the
methodologies that have been developed in Phase I to determine potential
uses and users of the STS in both the public and private sectors.
SUMMARY
In Phase II, we would propose:
* Expansion of the ADL Phase I effort to assess needs and requirements
of foreign users through direct field research in selected countries
overseas
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* Development of the major items of the proposed Tariff Model described
in Chapter VIII of this report in order to provide NASA and/or a
quasi-independent interface organization with the necessary tools/
aids for user community development, and to assist in making test
calls on prospective users using these tools/aids.
* Detailed development of the structure and programs of a new, inde-
pendent marketing entity which would ultimately make STS services,
supplied by NASA, available to the user community, including a care-
ful consideration of the transitional stages through which such a
development must move, over a 5-20 year period.
* Continuing elaboration of presently fragmentary knowledge about both
uses and users in the private sector, drawing on other studies and
contractors as appropriate.
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APPENDIX A
A GUIDELINE FOR INTERVIEWS WITH SELECTED U.S.
MULTINATIONAL FIRMS CONCERNING STS USER REQUIREMENTS
Arthur D Little, Inc.
INTRODUCTORY NOTE.
The following guidelines were developed by ADL eArly in this project
for use in stimulating comment on business policy and public policy issues
by respondents selected from top-level management of U.S. multinational
companies experienced in planning entry into advanced technologies. They
proved to be useful for this purpose and are included here as of possible
value in further explorations of this kind as well as an indication of the
agenda covered in the ADL interview program.
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A GUIDELINE FOR INTERVIEWS WITH SELECTED U.S.
MULTINATIONAL FIRMS CONCERNING STS USER REQUIREMENTS
A. Objectives
1. To identify "business/public policy" conditions perceived as
critical by potential commercial users - both as to incentives
and restraints for access to STS. Concentrate on perceptions of
foreign users and differentiate - where possible - from perceptions
of domestic users.
2. Explore sensitivity of prospective (foreign) users to alternate
models of access conditions.
B. Prospective Commercial Uses of STS
1. R&D ) in unique conditions of
) zero gravity, absolute vacuum,
2. Manufacturing ) zero contaminants, etc.
3. Sensing, e.g., of earth resources
4. Communication (other than Intelsat, etc.)
C. Business Public Policy Issues Likely to Be of Concern to Prospective Users
1. Who will be the seller of space in STS?
e.g., ' NASA, European Space Administration (both on equal
terms of all kinds?)
a quasi-public corporation like "Comsat"?
2. Who will have access to STS?
e.g., * all countries: Western, Bloc, Third World?
* individuals/companies who can afford the $10 million
flight (or any portion thereof)?
3. What will be the principal "new" constraints to access?
e.g., * assurance of safety of what's sent aloft?
* "special" environmental controls?
* peaceful uses only.
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How will these constraints be enforced?
* pricing structure, i.e., recovery of costs of flight only?
* national security/international policy matters, e.g., in
sensing mode who may look at whom, for what, and how will
data be treated?
* privacy of each user conducting his work from potential
"prying" competitors (in same vehicle or on same data
space/ground transmission system)?
* allocation of scarce resource (STS space) in accordance
with national objectives?
e.g., * preference for certain uses and therefore users?
Who will determine and control?
• evidence of commercialization potential and
user's commitment to follow through?
* who will pick route, orbit, length of flight?
4.. What are "existing" constraints to access?
e.g., * patent rights to inventions made while using STS?
User retains full rights; NASA has rights for government
use; NASA owns rights; NASA requires user to license at
reasonable royalty, etc., or what combination of these
alternatives?
* ownership rights on patents and know-how acquired. What
does user feel he wants or can reasonably expect?
e.g., * territorial rights - U.S. STS like U.S. flag
"ship at sea," or does "law of space" supervene?
* free to allocate right to others?
* political interventions by whom, e.g., in
sensing and communication uses?
* antitrust law effects on joint R&D or any of the other
use categories
* regulatory policies and law
e.g., * environmental; consumer safety; public interest,
etc.
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D. Comments on Ability of Prospective Users to Address Above Business/
Public Policy Issues
1. Are these issues unique in their experience and therefore their
responses "off the cuff"?
2. Should these issues be considered in the broader context of indus-
try access to government-owned facilities at large (e.g., in other
agencies)?
3. Do these issues raise serious questions of public policy that might
affect U.S. industrial/commercial competitiveness overseas (or at
home)? What are these questions and their parameters, and why?
E. Can Prospective Users Rank Severity of Issues in (3) Above - As of Now,
and As Likely to Be in the 1980s?
F. Can Prospective Users Describe Alternative Models (Packages) of Desired
Access Conditions and Give Pros and Cons for Each?
Summary
This is first opportunity (not last) for prospective users to take initiative
to make themselves heard in government on those business/public policy issues
that they believe would critically affect their interest or ability to become
actual users of STS. It would be useful for them therefore to cover the full
spectrum of their concerns as regards public policy issues and rank them, if
possible, by priority.
It may take long lead times to change public policies. That is why ADL is
making this early attempt (six years in advance of first flight) to help
guide NASA consideration of policy options designed to encourage commercial
uses of STS. Differentiation between perceptions of potential foreign users
and domestic users would be very desirable if possible.
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APPENDIX B
TECHNICAL BRIEF
SPACE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM (STS)
Arthur D Little, Inc
INTRODUCTORY NOTE
The technical brief reproduced in this appendix was developed by ADL
for use as background preceding interviews with respondents selected from
top-level management of U.S. multinational companies. We were surprised
to find, early in this project, that there did not appear to be available
in the official NASA literature at that time a succinct, up-to-date and
explicit description of STS and its capabilities suitable for this pur-
pose. We accordingly prepared the material in this appendix, which has
since been reviewed by the COR for this project. It is reproduced here
as having possible value as the beginning of an expanded description use-
ful in a Phase II market research program.
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TECHNICAL BRIEF
SPACE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM (STS)
INTRODUCTION
A new international space transportation system is now being developed
for operational use in the 1980's and beyond. It is designed to provide
economical transportation to and from Earth orbit and to allow more effi-
cient space exploration and utilization for man's benefit. The major
elements of this system can be reused after operations in Earth orbit and
will eventually replace practically all of the rocket launch vehicles now
used for placing payloads into space. These elements include the Space
Shuttle Orbiter and its solid rocket booster motors being developed with
industrial support by the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administra-
tion; the Spacelab manned laboratory being developed by NASA and the Euro-
pean Space Research Organization (ESRO)*; and an Interim Upper Stage (IUS)
for the Orbiter under development by the U.S. Department of Defense. A
more advanced upper stage called the Space Tug is also being developed by
NASA which will offer expanded capabilities and uses for the Space Trans-
portation System or STS after 1984. This will allow greater system flexi-
bility for operations in geosynchronous orbits, for orbital path changes
and deep space operations with emphasis on space rendezvous and docking
capability.
The complete system is designed to not only place a variety of payloads
into various Earth orbits and into trajectories throughout the solar system,
but it also will allow the retrieval, refurbishment, repair and even re-
firing of spacecraft, thus reducing operational expenses. It can also pro-
vice a "shirtsleeve" working environment so the crew and passengers can
spend up to one month in Earth orbit, performing the role of a manned space
station and allowing a variety of experimental and operational activities
to be performed in the unique environment found there. Due to the relaxed
physical standards and requirements for passengers, scientific investigators,
technicians, educators, journalists, and others may perform useful tasks in
space.
BACKGROUND
The concept for combining rocket and aircraft technology and allowing space-
craft to be returned to Earth from space was well established by early
rocketry and astronautical pioneers such as Goddard, Oberth, Tsiolkovsky,
and others. German rocket developments during World War II included flight
testing of winged V-2's and preliminary design of a manned recoverable ver-
sion of this historic rocket was prepared. A German scientist, Dr. Eugen
Soon to change its name to European Space Agency (ESA).
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SHnger, also performed detailed studies for a long range bomber which was,
in essence, an orbital rocket craft using its winged area to allow a glid-
ing return to earth with its crew by skipping across upper levels of the
atmosphere.
Popular articles in the mid 1950's, such as in the Collier's series on space
travel, emphasized the idea of reusable Earth-to-orbit space transportation
systems. And rocket aircraft developed during this post-war period helped
to evolve the concept. Many aerospace plane studies were likewise performed
and the Dynasoar program was established by the U.S. Department of Defense,
although this program for a reusable manned spacecraft was later cancelled.
With national commitments made for manned space activities in the 1960's,
priorities were given to ballistic type, non-recoverable launch vehicles
to meet Earth orbiting and Lunar landing schedules. This culminated in the
modification of military rockets such as the Redstone, Atlas, and Titan for
launching Mercury and Gemini spacecraft into orbit and the development of
larger rockets to boost much heavier payloads into space. The huge Saturn 5
rocket system developed by NASA provided the thrust required to place astro-
nauts on the moon and the means to allow their.safe return during the Apollo
program. This space vehicle was also used to launch a large, fully opera-
tional space station, the Skylab, into Earth orbit where it remains after
several lengthy visits by astronauts launched by Saturn lB rockets. To date
all launching rockets for the above programs and for unmanned missions, in-
cluding satellite and space probe launches, have been expendable and quite
costly.
As the Apollo program reached fruition, development of the next generation
of space launch vehicles, with emphasis on the reusable concept, was initi-
ated. After a number of evaluations, trade-offs, and feasibility studies,
the current space shuttle configuration evolved which will be developed in
the 1970's and made fully operational, along with other STS elements, in
the 1980's and beyond.
DESCRIPTION
Space Shuttle Vehicle (SSV) The complete vehicle includes the Orbiter, the
External Tank (ET), and the two Solid Rocket Boosters (SRB's). The Orbiter
is a piloted, rocket powered vehicle which accommodates the crew, passengers
and payloads. It is designed to be reused some 100 times and is about the
size of a DC-9 passenger aircraft. The External Tank provides liquid pro-
pellants for the Space Shuttle Main Engines (SSME) that power the Orbiter
and is expendable after propellant depletion. The booster engines are ig-
nited at launch together with the Orbiter main engines. Together they pro-
vide some 6.25 million pounds of thrust. When the booster engine firings.
are completed, the motor cases are jettisoned, recovered by parachutes, and
then refurbished for reuse. A two-week ground turnaround will be required
for the Orbiter from landing to liftoff.
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Spacelab This major Space Shuttle payload consists of standardized manned
laboratory modules and unmanned, unpressurized instrument platforms (pallets)
that will allow the Orbiter to conduct extended research and other activi-
ties during "sortie" missions lasting from 7 to 30 days in Earth orbit.
Thus, the combination of the Orbiter and Spacelab provides a reusable space
station capability, as the 32,000 pound Spacelab has an operational lifetime
of fifty missions. Nine European countries, members of ESRO, are sharing
the development costs of Spacelab with initial operations planned in the
early 1980's.
Space Tug For payload delivery to and return from very high orbits, or to
allow trajectories to the planets or beyond, additional propulsion stages
are required for the Space Shuttle. To accommodate early operations, the
U.S. Department of Defense has tentatively agreed to develop an Interim
Upper Stage (IUS) with a deployment capability of 5,000 pounds, but lacking
a payload retrieval capability. This agency plans to use the Space Shuttle
as a part of its defense activities. Later, a more advanced upper stage
will be developed and used to place about 4 tons of payload into Geosynchro-
nous Orbit (GS) at some 19,323 nautical miles altitude. This space tug, in
a round-trip mode, will also be able to deliver to and retrieve from GSO
some 2,750 pounds of payload.
MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
Current mission and payload planning documents indicate 782 Space Shuttle
flights will be required through 1991 with about one-third (31%) of these
required for the U.S. Department of Defense. Also, almost one-third (29%)
of the total flights will originate from the Western Test Range (WTR) at
Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, primarily for high inclination
(polar) orbits. Apollo program facilities located at the Eastern Test
Range (ETR) for NASA's Kennedy Space Center (KSC) will be modified to ac-
commodate the Space Shuttle Vehicle and its payloads for launch into more
eastern (equitorial) orbits. Multiple payloads are expected during Space
Shuttle flights although DOD payloads will not be combined with non-DOD
payloads. Additional missions and applications can also be expected as
further studies and contacts are made with other potential users of this
new transportation system.
PAYLOAD CHARACTERISTICS
The following listing provides the Space Shuttle capabilities and selected
payload parameters of interest to researchers, experimenters, and commer-
cial users of the STS:
* Crew and passenger load - crew of 4 plus 6 passengers
* Payload weights - 65,000 pounds to 100 nautical mile orbit
- 32,000 pounds return from 100 nautical mile orbit
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* Payload size (max.): 60 feet length
15 feet diameter
* Loading: 3 g's maximum (launch and re-entry)
+
* Pointing: - 0.5 degrees
+
* Stability: - 0.1 degree per second
* Deployment/Retrieval: Long reach manipulator arms (remotely
controlled by crew)
* Payload Environmental Criteria
Pressure: Payload Bay Unpressurized
Temperature Range 
-
Prelaunch: +400 to +120 0 F
Launch: +400 to 0150 0F
Entry/Landing: -100 to +200 0 F
Heat Rejection Provision: 21,500 BTU/hr.
* Power Available
Baseline: 50 KWH
During orbit: 3.0 KW average
6.0 KW peak
During Orbiter Operations: 1.0 KW average
1.5 KW peak
PAYLOAD APPLICATIONS
The current NASA payload analysis outlines possible future payloads as a
baseline which can be used for reference and planning purposes. With almost
a thousand payloads identified and represented during the initial eleven-
year period of Space Shuttle operations (1980-1991), NASA documents indicate
about one-third of these will be sortie payloads, requiring Spacelab. Low
Earth Orbit payloads will comprise about two-thirds of the total sent into
space.
Listed below are codes for the automated (free flying) and sortie (attached
to Orbiter) payload programs currently identified to meet the projected
mission objectives of STS.
* ASTRONOMY (AST)
* COMMUNICATION AND NAVIGATION (C/N)
* EARTH OBSERVATIONS (EO)
EARTH AND OCEAN PHYSICS (EOP)
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" LIFE SCIENCE (LS)
* LUNAR EXPLORATION (LUN)
* PLANETARY EXPLORATION (PL)
* PHYSICS (PHY)
* SPACE PROCESSING (SP)
* SPACE TECHNOLOGY (ST)
ECONOMIC DATA
The currently planned Space Transportation System assumes a continuing and
constant NASA level budget of $3.3 billion yearly. Other items of economic
interest are listed below. These figures were used in the "October 1973
NASA Payload Model" document and are based on 1972 dollars.
* Estimated R&D costs for the Space Shuttle - $5.4 billion
" Estimated R&D costs for Spacelab - $300-400 million
* Estimated comparative savings for STS over Expendable Systems -
$14 billion during 1980 to 1991
* Estimated cost per Space Shuttle flight - $9.8 million
* Estimated additional cost per Space Tug mode - $.85 million
NEW APPLICATIONS
Efforts are currently underway to stimulate new awareness and interest in
the STS and its potential applications. An Advanced Payload Analysis (APA)
is being directed toward the development of methodologies required for
identifying new STS users. Emphasis is being placed on domestic and foreign
government agencies, industrial communities and educational communities.
Also, studies are being made to develop a policy and basis for STS user
flight charges.
Sampling techniques are being applied to validate the approaches now being
considered for new STS applications. Also, many new ideas for meeting na-
tional and international goals in such critical fields as energy and natural
resource development; environmental protection; communication and educational
improvements; and advanced materials development can be investigated and ap-
plied with the aid of this new technological tool.
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APPENDIX C
COMPANIES AND ORGANIZATIONS INCLUDED IN
ADL INTERVIEW PROGRAM AND/OR SPACE SHUTTLE -SURVEY
BY THE INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE, INC.
Arthur D Little, Inc.
INTRODUCTORY NOTE
As reported in Chapter III ADL staff interviewed a selected list of
members of top-level staff of multinational corporations known to be ex-
perienced in adopting advanced technologies in order to obtain a percep-
tion of business and public policy issues likely to be considered import-
ant in decisions to invest in utilizing the STS when it becomes available
in the 1980's. This was supplemented, as noted, by a survey performed,
at ADL's suggestion, by the Industrial Research Institute, Inc., the lead-
ing professional organization of U.S. corporate Directors of Research.
This appendix lists the companies and other organizations with whom contact
was made.
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COMPANIES AND ORGANIZATIONS INCLUDED IN
ADL INTERVIEW PROGRAM AND/OR SPACE SHUTTLE SURVEY
BY THE INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE, INC.
A M F Incorporated
Abbott Laboratories
Allegheny Ludlum Industries, Inc.
Aluminum Company of America
The Bendix Corporation
Burlington Industries, Inc.
The Cabot Corporation
Campbell Institute for Food Research
The Carborundum Company
Chevron Research Company
Communications Satellite Corporation
Corning Glass Works
Crown Zellerbach Corporation
Debevoise, Plimpton & Page (Corporate Counsel)
The Dow Chemical Company
E. I. Du Pont de Nemours and Company, Incorporated
Eastman Kodak Company
Esso Research and Engineering Company
Ford Motor Company
General Electric Co. (Corporate Headquarters)
General Electric Company, Space Technology Center
General Foods Corporation
General Mills, Inc.
The B. F. Goodrich Company
Gould Inc.
International Business Machines Corporation
Kennecott Copper Corporation
Kimberly-Clark Corporation
Eli Lilly and Company
Mallinckrodt Chemical Works
Owens-Illinois, Inc.
Polaroid Corporation
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The Procter & Gamble Company
RCA Corporation
Ralston Purina Company
Sperry Rand Corporation
E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc.
Sterling Drug, Inc.
J. P. Stevens & Co., Inc.
Texas Instruments Incorporated
Union Carbide Corporation
UNIROYAL, Inc.
Universal Oil Products Company
Whirlpool Corporation
Xerox Corporation
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